Why Boko Haram Cannot Capture Abuja

By Babatope Falade

I have had cause to think about the safety of Abuja, especially the activity of bandits around Kaduna to Abuja highways. A couple of friends there have also expressed concern about the likelihood of a Borno or other similar attacks in Abuja. The fact is that it won’t happen. Why do I make this assertion?

Understanding the security landscape between the Sahel and Abuja will help prove this assertion. People who understand the security landscape in Nigeria will appreciate that a greater part of the support that terrorists and insurgents in Nigeria get comes from the Sahel region. The Sahel region serves as the buffer between West Africa, and the Sahara Desert regions.

The Sahel

The Sahel is made up of countries such as Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Chad, Sudan, Eritrea, Niger, Burkina Faso and a part of Borno in Nigeria. A lot of logistics, such as weapons, intelligence with foreign terrorists, information, training and other materiel comes from the Sahel. This route is not entirely a menace for Nigeria, it also serves as a strategic buffer for Nigeria, especially if we have friendly neighbors. A buffer in security studies means an obstacle that prevents a direct or easy attack on the homeland of another country. Homeland meaning Nigeria in this case. Terrorists or military aliens and their materials have to go through the Sahel and will be degraded before they get into Nigeria. But we need friendly neighbors to realize the gains of such international borders.

This is why we can say Tinubu goofed by taking a hardline during the military coup that happened in Niger. Thereby putting the trio military regimes in; Mali, Burkina-Faso and Niger against ECOWAS. In the case of Niger Republic, it is safe to say they are a brother country because majority of Nigeriens speak Hausa. Infact, there are Yoruba’s who live there and claim Niger Republic. Despite these challenges, we can assume we still have benefit of the Sahel buffer. This leads us to other strategic considerations such as military size and strength military formations, internal buffers, civil-military relations. Hence, the second point of consideration is Nigeria’s Military Size and Strength.

Military Size and Strength

Desk research shows that Nigeria has about 180,000 active personnel. A breakdown of the military by branch resolves to: Nigerian Army- 100,000-200,000 Nigerian Navy-15,000-20,000 Nigerian Airforce- 10,000-15,000 Nigeria is also has the fourth most powerful military in Africa; after Egypt, Algeria and South Africa. The major challenge of our military lies in adapting to banditry, counter-insurgency and piracy and maritime challenges. But efforts at counter-insurgency have improved over time. This brings us back to Boko Haram and Bandits.

While we cannot ascertain the strategic nature of the banditry threat, what we know points us at the fact that bandits are not a unified force with an ideology, grievance and political objectives. The nature of their attacks borders more on skirmishes and looting. Naturally, paramilitary strategies and operations should take care of this threat, but this is Nigeria. This takes us back to Boko Haram. Boko Haram is an organization with a clear ideology and a desire to control politics and achieve statehood of conquered areas. Hence, they have recruitment operations and a range of their size has been defined to a large extent. Their peak strength, which is between (2014-2015) was 10,000-15,000. Today, that number is out around 3,000-5,000. This is largely because the military has figured a better counter-insurgency approach, and the government under Buhari created a program to de-radicalize Boko Haram fighters and rehabilitate them. This was a timely effort and strategy because allowing their ranks to swell portends a greater threat for Nigeria, especially areas below the North-East, down to the North-West and North-Central where the likes of Abuja are situated.

In military strategy, while weapons and organization have soldierly taken the place of numbers/size, size still matters in how fast military objectives such as offense and defense can be achieved. This element of military strategy is expressed in the ratio of fighter recommendations, especially depending on the terrain or whether you are maintaining an offense or defense strategy.

See some considerations in line with the above.

1. Offense: In the offense case, we can have a range of 3:1 to 5:1; that is three or five attackers to one defender). This tactic results in high casualty, but allows the offense side to overwhelm the defending side. In this case, Nigerian Army will be the defender and the insurgents will be on the offensive.

2. Defense Warfare: In the case of defending, the defense side may have capability to hold off the offense side, but the risk of being isolated or surrounded his high. A well-entrenched defender can hold off a larger force, but may become isolated or surrounded. Typically, you have (1 defender to 3 offense or 1 defender to 5 offense personnel- 1:3 or 1:5)

3. Guerrilla Warfare: Guerrilla warfare involves tactics that exploit skirmishes, ambushes, sabotage and occasional exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities. This will usually involve the use of small and mobile forces against larger conventional armies. Typical ratios will be 1:10 to 1:20 respectively.

4. Urban Warfare: Urban warfare has a 5:1 to 10:1 scenario, where there is a need for more soldiers needed due to complex terrain- meanwhile, urban warfare favors the defender because they probably understand the area better.

The other considerations are;

-Technology (e.g., artillery, air support, or advanced sensors)

-Terrain (e.g., forests, deserts, or urban areas)

-Training and discipline

-Morale and leadership

-Logistics and supply chains

It is evident that Nigeria has the upper hand in all of these warfare scenarios. The ratio of the current army size to that of current Boko Haram, using upper limits is 36 to 1 respectively. However, this is not enough to conclude the analysis on the military capability to protect Nigeria. It is important to understand Nigeria’s military organization; based on military formations/divisions.

Military Formations/Divisions

Currently, Nigeria has 10 military divisions. We will highlight the strategic divisions that are proximate and can be mobilized to protect Abuja from a takeover. Under the criteria above, the following divisions are highlighted:

-7 Infantry Division in Maiduguri, Borno
-8 Taskforce Division in Borno
-1st Mechanized Division in Kaduna
-3 Armoured Division in Plateau

The military formations in Borno serve as a buffer between terrorists and Abuja. But there is no better place more suited for the protection of Abuja than Kaduna. A quick view of the map of Nigeria attached here will reveal this fact. First of all, it will be difficult for terrorists to March in Abuja from Borno because there are well established divisions there. Then any March in Abuja will probably come from the other North West states, but they have to pass through Kaduna. This makes Kaduna the major internal buffer for Abuja. And we explain this under the internal buffer, where Kaduna is the key buffer against an insurgent take over.

Internal Buffers- Kaduna as Key Buffer

Traditionally, it is safe to call Kaduna the heartbeat of the military because it plays host to the following military installations/establishments.

-National Defence Academy
-Yankari Barracks
-Nigeria Army School of Infantry (NASI) in Jaji, Kaduna
-The Nigerian Army School of Legal Services, Bassawa Zaria
-Nigerian Defence Academy
-Nigerian Army School of Artillery, Kachia
-Nigerian Army School of Military Police
Army Operation Base
-Nigerian Army Depot, Zaria
-Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji
-Nigerian Defense Industry
-Nigerian Airforce Training School
-Nigerian Police College
-Nigerian Navy School of Armament, Kachia.

In addition to these military installations, effort is underway to establish three new military bases in; Southern Kaduna, Giwa, and Birnin-Gwari Local Government Areas.
Kaduna, by many yards is the supremo when it comes to the military complex in Nigeria, and it is strategically and geographically positioned, as well as serving as a buffer and linchpin to protect Abuja and the rest of the southern part of the country from advancement of terrorists.

The import of this analysis is that once Kaduna is conquered by insurgents, it is all over. The implication of losing Kaduna to invaders means Maiduguri has been conquered. The distance between Maiduguri and Kaduna is about 800km, meaning the infantry divisions should be able to deal with the threat as soon as entry is made through that part of the country. The distance of other parts (Kebbi on the West, Katsina on the North, Adamawa on the East) of the North-West and North-East to Kaduna is an average of 570 km. In the event of an attack from these flanks, the Kaduna installations have to wage an offense, while the troops in the far North East and other parts of the north play defense of parts of Kaduna and Abuja itself.

It should be stressed that these descriptions are hypothetical and an attempt at the war games with insurgents. It must be stressed that the likelihood of an insurgent attack of this magnitude is less than 2 percent. Hence, we can surmise that Abuja is safe because of the strategic military formations between Kaduna and the Sahel, where the most imminent threat is located.

Thus far, considerations such as the nature of the Sahel, military size and strength, military formation and internal buffers has been discussed. However, every military strategy or doctrine cannot ignore civil-military relations. While civil-military relations is a complex subject, the fundamental element lies in whether the civilian population has a desired level of trust in the military and the government of the day.

Civil-Military Relations in Counter-Insurgency

Conventional counter-insurgency strategies include alignment of military objectives with civilian objectives, which often leads to development of safety programs, economic development programs, cultural sensitivity and intelligence gathering from the civilian populace. We see similar effort in with the civilian JTF in the fight against Boko Haram. A similar approach was employed by General David Petraeus in the Iraq war, where after defeat of the conventional army, the US struggled with the threat of Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) insurgents, and the gains of the earlier battles seem to be getting lost. He simply worked to regain the trust of the local populations in Iraqi cities and local areas, and the US Army was able to ensure order and record gains against the insurgents.

However, in the event of a sudden attack, the level of success the military records will depend heavily on the level of cooperation they get from the local population across the country. The import of this position is that every military needs the goodwill of the local population to win against a formidable opponent.

In the case of urban warfare, which will be the case of engagements in Kaduna and Abuja, the situation becomes dire. Buildings cannot be razed at will, same with public utilities, hence, the strategy will be different, compared to when the theatre of war is the forest or savannah or even mountainous terrains. This requires cooperation and sharing of intelligence by residents.

If the residents are antagonistic to the current government or an oppressive state, it becomes hard to win.

In the case of Abuja, it is evident that the heinous activities of Boko Haram and their bandit cousins has left a bitter taste in the mouths of all Nigerians, and they don’t have any sympathizers to take over a place like Abuja.

Hence, the review of all indicators shows that Abuja is safe under all the current conditions highlighted and discussed.